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Introduction
China"s long insistence on non-interference and sovereignty and frequent criticism of Western interventionism has created a widely held impression that China lends and invests abroad without attaching policy conditions. Under this view, Chinese financing institutions, unlike Western governments or Western-controlled institutions, grant loans without requiring the recipient government adhere to certain political standards (e.g. governance) or adjust their economic policies (Bosshard, 2007; 刁 and 何, 2008: 125-126; Foster et al., 2008: 6; 周, 2008; Chin and Helleiner, 2008: 90; Farnsworth, 2011: 60; Bräutigam, 2010: 37, 39-40; Dennison and Dworkin, 2010: 2) .
Indeed, respect for state sovereignty and non-interference have been guiding principles of
Chinese foreign policy for decades. Premier Zhou Enlai coined the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence during negotiations between China and India in 1954. 2 The purpose of the Five Principles policy was to ensure that the newly independent countries would avoid the aggressive relationship they earlier experienced with colonial powers. 3 China"s current leadership still rhetorically sticks to the principle of non-interference in foreign policy, but often couches it in a context of mutually beneficial cooperation or common development. Illustrative of this is former Chinese Foreign
Minister Li Zhaoxing"s statement that "mutual respect and non-interference in each other"s internal affairs between countries are the necessary conditions for building a harmonious world." (China Daily, 2007) . Apart from obtaining United Nation"s Security Council authorisation for any crisis management action, China"s government regards host nation consent as a major distinguishing line that divides extensive Chinese involvement in Africa, for example, from Western intervention during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Van Hoeymissen, 2009) . The Chinese government is thus able to claim that it does not intervene in other countries" sovereign affairs.
In Zhou Enlai"s 1964 outlining of China"s eight principles on aid to foreign countries, he stated that "the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges." (Bräutigam, 2009: 29) . Beijing has since 2 The Five Principles are 1) mutual respect for each other"s sovereignty and territorial integrity (互相尊重主权和领土完整);
2) mutual non-aggression (互不侵犯); 3) mutual non-interference in each other"s internal affairs (互不干涉内政); 4) equality and mutual benefit (平等互利); and 5) peaceful co-existence (和平共处). 3 The principle of non-interference is alluded to in Article 2, parts (4) and (7), of the first chapter of the Charter of the United Nations. While not explicitly stated, non-interference is also implicit in many provisions and a well-established guiding rule of international conduct (Chatham House, 2007) . Since its suggestion in 2001, a lively debate has gone on within the UN system on modifying the non-interference principle to include "responsibility to protect" (see e.g. ICISS, 2001 ).
consistently maintained that it does not impose political conditions to its lending and aid. For example, at the closing ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation Ministerial Conference in October 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said "China never attaches any political string to its assistance to Africa or seeks any political privilege in doing so." (PRC Foreign Ministry, 2000) .
Wary of foreign criticism of China"s tying financial aid to securing access to natural resources, the Chinese State Council recently released its first-ever White Paper on Chinese foreign aid. The White Paper stresses that China does not attach any political conditionalities whatsoever to its foreign assistance, nor does it interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries or seek political privileges (中华人民共和国国务院, 2011: 2-3) .
In this paper, we challenge the view cherished in China and widely accepted internationally that Chinese bilateral lending is devoid of conditionality. We ask whether this "no-stringsattached" perception stems from a limited view of conditionality encompassing only the kinds of conditions attached by the IMF and World Bank that misses the conditionality inherent to Chinese lending. Our argument is that the assumption of China not attaching policy conditions in its lending is valid only in a narrow sense, understood as demanding adherence to certain governance and transparency standards or concrete changes to economic policy such as privatisation. In the broad sense, China is certainly not above attaching conditions to lending. However, most conditions are probably not imposed by a unitary state actor. They instead emerge from the voluminous business activities of Chinese state-linked lenders and enterprises in developing countries.
Data sources and caveats
Researching Chinese bilateral lending is fraught with data challenges. Comprehensive information on all bilateral loan frameworks and detailed numerical data related to policy-based lending are not publicly available. Specific loan covenants are confidential and the lending institutions in question are not particularly transparent or accessible. Unsurprisingly, relatively little is known about the terms of Chinese concessional loans (Foster et al., 2008: 40-44; Hubbard, 2007: 8-9 7 formation on them was not available from any official Chinese sources (Foster et al., 2008: 12) .
This lack of comprehensive and solid data does not make the topic amenable to econometric analysis, so we have adopted an eclectic approach to data-gathering, using data from multiple sources.
First, we use information on loan deals available from publicly available Chinese sources (e.g. the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Commerce, and the contract database of the Beijing University Faculty of Law). We also draw on scattered case-evidence and targeted anonymous interviews and discussions with people knowledgeable regarding various aspects of international lending. We have supplemented these sources with reviews of the Chinese policy debate, as well as drawn on secondary sources in the relevant literature.
The paper gauges China"s position towards attaching explicit policy conditions to lending by first surveying the general debate on conditionality in policy-based lending and the Chinese domestic debate on conditionality. For this purpose, we conducted an extensive review of the Chinese policy debate (academic journals, official statements, media columns, etc.) in the period 2007-2010. We then turn to examine China"s bilateral lending practices, focusing on one of China"s three major state-owned "policy banks," the China Exim Bank (Chexim). China"s two other policy banks are China Development Bank (CDB) and Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC).
Based on the analysis, we hypothesise four kinds of conditionality related to Chinese bilateral lending: political conditionality, embedded conditionality, cross-conditionality and emergent conditionality. A caveat regarding the empirical validity of these conditionality types needs to be mentioned here: our claims should be regarded only as tentative, suggesting perhaps the way forward for further empirical study. The first two of the conditionality forms we identify are relatively well grounded empirically and based on the general features of Chinese bilateral lending and intergovernmental agreements. The latter two, in contrast, are constructs arising mainly from scattered case-evidence, as well as our understandings of the nature and features of Chinese policy-based financing. Further empirical research obviously is required to validate their prevalence.
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The debate on conditionality in policy-based lending
Attaching policy conditions to lending is by no means a new phenomenon. In the scholarly debate, especially the policy conditions attached by lending institutions of the World Bank Group have long been noted. 4 However, conditionality in policy-based lending subsequently also spread to regional development banks and bilateral donors (Koeberle et al., 2005: 5) . In conjunction with IMF aid requests in the 1980s, the IMF typically demanded "structural reforms" as a condition for receiving financial aid.5
The IMF and the World Bank shy away from the overtly political conditions related to "democracy" or "human rights" individual countries may apply in their development lending. In fact, the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank"s lending institutions prohibit them from interfering in a country"s political affairs and making decisions based on the political character of the member country (see e.g. IBRD, 1989 , Art. IV, section 10). Similar restrictions apply to the IMF (Bräutigam, 2010: 16, 44 ). In the self-understanding of these institutions, they have a non-political mandate, in comparison to "political" institutions such as the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, the World Bank institutions have occasionally been criticised for pursuing political objectives (Swedberg 1986: 386; Bacha, 1987; Teivainen, 1994: 19-24; Marquette, 2004 (Hunter and Brown, 2000: 117) . The significance of World Bank and IMF conditionality then goes beyond the funding provided by these institutions themselves.
A different strand of conditionality critique concerns the ineffectiveness of lending conditionality pursued by the World Bank Group institutions (e.g. Hunter and Brown, 2000; Weyland, 2003; Kaufman and Nelson, 2004) . Financial aid affects policy reforms in complex ways, providing ample space for recipient governments to resist external pressures. Conditionality is often most effective when it coincides with domestic policy priorities and development needs (Wigell, 2011; Pridham, 2010) . This line of critique has been prominent among IMF and World Bank economists, with much of the conditionality discussion in recent years revolving around the concept of "country ownership" (see e.g. Koeberle et al., 2005 (Chin, 2010: 703; Henning, 2002: 19-20; Ranjan and Prakash, 2010: 12) . An often noted distinguishing feature of China"s foreign policy is its strong emphasis on principles (Zhang, 2008: 161) . The policy conditionality of IMF and the World Bank seemingly clashes directly with the non-interference principle that supposedly guides much of China"s foreign policy. The Chinese government has recently toned down its insistence on absolute noninterference, e.g. expressing concern over the stituation in Sudan (e.g. Evans and Steinberg, 2007; 谢, 2010: 43) and shown a willingness to speak up when Chinese interests abroad are threatened. In
February 2011, China surprised many by voting for a UN Security Council resolution on Libya (1970) that referred the situation to the International Criminal Court, a move that by some observers was interpreted as indicating a subtle change towards less intransigence on non-interference.
Nevertheless, in the domestic policy debate within China, the policy conditionality demands of multilateral organisations are frequently criticised. 6 They are seen as a means of interference in other countries" domestic affairs. During the Asian financial crisis 1997-1998, conditionality came to be seen as a key part of the "Washington Consensus," a term originally used to describe a set of policy recommendations imposed on Latin American countries" economic, fiscal and financial policies in the 1980s (see Williamson, 1990 and . More than a decade after the Asian financial crisis, the policy prescriptions and reforms required by the IMF are still commonly regarded among Chinese experts as having failed to achieve their objectives and fit badly with East
Asian societies, while causing considerable economic and social pain (e.g. (Bräutigam, 2010: 19) , they are, nonetheless, significant.
Most of China"s development lending is done by the Chexim and CDB. Administratively, Chexim is directly under the Chinese State Council. CDB is more focused on investments and is owned by Central Huijin Investment, which, in turn, is owned by China Investment Corporation.
CIC sits administratively under the Ministry of Finance (Walter and Howie, 2011: 218) . Given that
Chexim is the sole government-authorized source of concessional loans and export credits in China, 7 and that it incorporates a role that in many other countries is handled by designated bilateral donor institutions (Foster et al., 2008: 40-41) , growth in the balance sheet of Chexim provides a proxy for China"s growing bilateral development lending. From a modest beginning in the mid1990s, Chexim"s balance sheet has recently outpaced the balance sheet assets of the Asian Development Bank (see Figure 1) . The compound annual growth rate for the bank"s balance sheet has been a staggering 47.0 % over the course of its existence, and a still-respectable 27.7 % in the decade to 2009, with the last two years showing a clear jump in balance sheet assets. (Bräutigam, 2010: 38) . These packages have been compared to OECD "mixed credits" (ibid: 20), but the Chinese financing packages may be more relaxed on environmental and anti-bribery requirements (OECD countries customarily set environmental and anti-bribery requirements on the projects they support with official development assistance). Furthermore, Chinese financing packages do not need to be reported to other countries, so they evade external review.
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The emergence of the Chinese policy banks as major players on the international development lending scene has had a significant impact on efforts to erect and maintain common standards and practices in bilateral development lending. China has taken an ambivalent attitude towards efforts at setting lending standards coordinated under the auspices of the OECD. According to the agreement among OECD members concessional loans can be offered with longer repayment terms and lower interest rates than might otherwise be offered by the market. China observes the OECD work undertaken on officially supported export credits and tied-aid credits, but does not endorse OECD guidelines on lending that take the form of "gentleman"s agreements" (OECD, 2010).
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China, however, frequently uses the term "concessional" to denote loans it provides to developing countries. As a result, there has been substantial debate over how "concessional" Chinese concessional loans are in practice. The case-evidence (Bräutigam, 2010: 22-23) , and the terms of publicly available concessional loan framework agreements suggest Chinese concessional loans are not particularly concessional when it comes to maturities or interest rates. average, the assessed Chinese loans offered an interest rate of 3.6 %, a grace period of four years and a maturity of twelve years. There is, however, much variation in the financing terms of Chinese financing institutions, depending on the recipient country. Overall, the assessed Chinese concessional loans offered a moderate level of concessionality which was well above private creditors but lower than other official creditors (Foster et al., 2008: 46-47) .
In providing a concessional loan, a framework agreement is first drawn up between the governments of China and the recipient country. No complete set of concluded agreements is published, and even the details of the reported framework agreements are often sketchy. (Foster et al., 2008: 40-41) .
Probably the most comprehensive assessment, the recent State Council White Paper on Chinese aid, claims 325 concessional-loan-financed projects in 76 countries (中华人民共和国国务院, 2011: 4) .
Concessional loans are always denominated in yuan, while preferential export credits are denominated in other currencies. In practice, however, Chinese development lending almost never involves direct transfers of money to the target country through loans and only rarely takes the form of cash grants (Foster et al., 2008: 43; Bräutigam, 2010: 19) . When a Chinese policy bank makes a concessional loan, the money typically never leaves China. Chexim, for instance, pays the Chinese contractors or suppliers in yuan and the recipient pays off in dollar installments to Chexim. One condition for such a loan is that the project has a Chinese lead contractor so that the loan can be transferred directly from the lender"s account to the lead contractor"s account in a Chinese bank.
The borrower then repays in installments to the Chinese policy bank in an agreed currency or form.
The practice is common in bilateral development lending and export credit financing in general.
This lending practice forms a natural springboard for increasing international use of the yuan. In December 2010, Chexim announced that in the coming five years it would use its position to promote internationalisation of the yuan in cross-border trade and investment (China Radio International, 2010) . This is in line with the policy objectives of the Chinese government. The recently released 12 th five-year plan endorses gradual increase of the yuan in international trade and promoting its greater international use (中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划的建议, 2010: 28, 30 ). China"s central bank has also announced measures to this effect. Earlier, China has already concluded a number of bilateral swap agreements using the yuan (see Appendix 2). Requiring the use of the Chinese currency in bilateral lending and how the Chinese policy banks will put the policy objectives of the 12 th five-year plan into practice are evolving issues.
Lending with Chinese conditions
Below we describe and explain the four types of conditionality we have identified by examining specific cases and the general literature on Chinese lending.
Political conditionality. Political conditionality refers to the recipient country needing to meet basic diplomatic and political preconditions prior to receiving any funding. These include diplomatic relations and toeing the line on Chinese political sensitivities. This political conditionality inherent in Chinese diplomatic dealings is akin to the political conditionality applied by the European Union.
The EU routinely demands the inclusion of a "democracy and human rights clause" when signing partnership agreements with non-EU governments.
While the policy conditionality of international financing institutions is often criticised in the Chinese debate and Chinese foreign policy supposedly is guided by the non-interference principle, Beijing itself has often attached broad political conditions for reaching diplomatic agreements (Zhang, 2008: 162 the PRC (with the exception of Swaziland). As a rule then, Chinese aid and bank credits are given to countries with which China has diplomatic ties (Bräutigam, 2010: 7, 29-30) . This has larger trade implications as China is known to have asked its trading partners to support the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan (Farnsworth, 2011: 56) , and has restricted and punished countries that do not obey Bei- Some scholars argue that China"s conditionality when it comes to aid is almost entirely political; requiring recipient countries to support China"s positions on various global issues (Bergsten, 2008) . There is relative certainty regarding the fact that the positions on human rights and global governance issues of China and other developing countries are increasingly aligned (Holslag, 2010: 8) . A harder-to-answer question is whether receiving ample Chinese funding and endorsing such general political statements commonly incorporated into bilateral communiqués and agreements actually results in other countries aligning their political positions with China or complying with China"s wishes. Some even argue that it is China which is aligning its position with developing countries (Bräutigam, 2010: 38 ). Embedded conditionality. Embedded conditionality refers to the recipient country needing to adhere to a number or project-related demands regarding, for example, the use of Chinese-sourced contractors, sub-contractors, technology, equipment suppliers, management and training, as well as a Chinese workforce. Scholars have long identified the purchase of donor country exports, or "captive demand," as a condition of foreign aid (Richardson, 1978: 56) . Chinese experts also recognise that making aid conditional on the purchase of donor country products and technologies is one of the main economic aims of foreign aid (刁 and 何, 2008: 123-124) .
Whereas the proportion of untied aid of all bilateral aid has risen to 82 % for Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries (Clay et al., 2009: 12) , Chinese external assistance still consists entirely of "tied aid" (Chin and Frolic, 2007: 11, 14) . Tied aid refers to an international practice whereby the borrower is tied to purchase the required technology or equipment from the lender country. In a tied-aid arrangement, the loan interest rate is low and eligibility is limited, according to OECD rules regulating ODA, to low-and lower-middle-income countries. As mentioned, China is not a party to the OECD agreement, so it does not adhere to this convention. Naturally, China also does not need to report its ODA to those countries that are party to the OECD agreement.
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China provides concessional loans to upper-middle-income countries for which ODA normally is not an important part of the national economy. China"s White Paper on aid mentions that 11 % of Chinese foreign assistance has gone to upper-middle income countries (中华人民共和国国务 院, 2011: 9). In Table 1 , we have extracted those concessional loan framework agreements from Appendix 1 that China has concluded with upper-middle-income countries. China also directs some of its foreign aid, especially concessional loans, into economically viable sectors, such as telecommunications, mining, and other industrial projects (周, 2008: 40) , i.e. activities forbidden to parties to the OECD agreement. According to the guidelines agreed within the OECD, countries can only provide tied-aid loans to commercially non-viable projects.
12 Table 1 Select upper-middle income countries with which China has concluded concessional loan framework agreements, and total net ODA as a % of GNI (2000- It seems that concessional loans and preferential buyer"s export credits have become central components in financing Chinese business operations abroad. According to the Chexim, such loans are directed into manufacturing projects, infrastructure construction projects and social welfare projects in the borrowing country that will generate promising economic returns or good social benefits (China Exim Bank, 2009) . In a typical case of Chinese policy bank financing, Chexim provides a loan denominated in the Chinese currency for a recipient company, local or central government. A central condition to qualify for the loan is that the recipient uses a Chinese contractor in engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) phases, as well as import essential technologies and equipment from China and allow the contractor and subcontractors to use a Chinese workforce (Bräutigam, 2010: 29-30) . In many cases, this model excludes local businesses and restricts utilisa- loans, building a vast number of infrastructure projects. 13 According to the agreements, the money could only be used for infrastructure building and 70 % of the projects would be awarded to Chinese state-owned enterprises approved by the Chinese government that brought over their own labour from China. Loan repayments are made in oil, making Angola the largest source of crude oil imports for China (Foster et al., 2008: 20-21, 42-43; Bräutigam, 2010: 20-21; Michel and Beuret, 2009: 214-215) . The large role played by state-owned enterprises in implementing Chinese development projects has been noted even by Chinese scholars as a peculiar feature of Chinese foreign aid (刁 and 何, 2008: 132) .
Apart from the few political conditions described above, Chinese policy-based lenders do not demand explicit policy conditions up-front like many other lenders. This facilitates the speed with which Chinese loans can be granted − a crucial competitive advantage in export financing. On the other hand, it stands clear that on a project level, Chinese sovereign-backed financing commonly comes with a number of conditions attached. This is not unusual per se as, for example, tied aid of other countries includes similar provisions. However, Chinese requirements regarding use of Chinese inputs (labour, contractors, etc.) appear to be generally higher than in most cases. What makes Chinese financing somewhat more sui generis is the fact that, unlike most bilateral lenders, all Chinese policy-based financing follows the tied-aid model, including financing for higher income countries. Conditionality here does not refer to demands for outright changes of a country"s economic policy, rather conditionality is embedded in the project financing requirements.
Cross-conditionality. In the literature, cross-conditionality (sometimes referred to as implicit conditionality) indicates a situation where the conditions established by other creditors may de facto become conditions for loan disbursement of a new creditor (IMF, 2002: 40; Koeberle, 2005: 11) . In the Chinese case, we contend that cross-conditionality refers to a situation whereby using funding provided by Chinese policy banks provides a lever to demand actions from the recipient country in some other context before loan disbursement.
An apparent case of cross-conditionality occurred in Indonesia, where China agreed to finance most of the estimated US$8 billion budget for construction of a dozen coal-fired power plants with a total capacity of 10,000 MW to be operated by Indonesian state-owned electricity company PLN. The financing was provided by Chexim, CDB and Bank of China. In January 2009, after providing an initial $2 billion loan tranche, the Chinese financiers suddenly suspended the release of further disbursements to all power plant projects. Separately, the CDB also pulled out of financing another power project in South Sulawesi Province, leading to the project"s postponement. According to Indonesian sources, the Chinese financiers provided different explanations for their actions; they were either demanding higher interest rates than agreed in the original contract, or arguing, as the CDB, that they were "having problems" financing the project (PSIREN, 2009; Jakarta Globe, 2009a; 2009b) .
In February According to the Indonesian Minister of Energy, the situation had put them in a "hostage situation" that could only be solved if the Indonesian government caved to Chinese demands to first settle the Merpati dispute. The Chinese financiers also demanded higher interest rates in the PLN loans than originally agreed. In response, the Indonesian government sent a high-level delegation, led by its ministers for finance and trade, to China to seek clarification regarding Beijing"s intentions and to de-link the disputed aicraft deal from power-plant financing. The dispute was eventually resolved after the ministers" trip. The Indonesian Finance Minister later requested that Chinese yuan, instead of US dollars, would be used for the procurement of project facilities from China (PSIREN, 2009; Jakarta Post, 2009a; 2009b; Jakarta Globe, 2009b) .
Caution needs to be exercised in generalising on this case and the possible linkages between separate financing deals as the information is based on second-hand sources. Nevertheless, the case suggests that large-scale Chinese financing in developing countries can confer leverage on
Chinese state-linked financial institutions that extends across projects in the same recipient country.
Emergent conditionality. Emergent conditionality refers to the structural effects a history of Chinese funding and investment might create in the future. We stress that the existence of such conditionality is merely hypothetical as we have yet to see solid empirical validation.
Major infrastructure projects (e.g. power plants, railway networks, telecom networks) funded by Chinese policy banks usually involve transfer of complex technology, hardware, software and managerial know-how from China. The large size of these projects and high concentration of sourcing and management in Chinese hands at all stages of the project (design, construction, installation, testing, training, and post-construction management) create technological, financial, managerial and educational dependencies that over time could create political dependency between the host country and China (周, 2008: 39) . We are referring here to a situation where the recipient country"s manoeuvrability is restricted by the accumulated weight of the "sunken costs" of relying extensively on China for critical aspects of major infrastructure projects.
While Chinese lending and investments are distributed around the globe, many of China"s largest financial and infrastructure commitments are concentrated in a few countries. In subSaharan Africa, for example, 70 % of Chinese financing commitments during 2001-2007 went to Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia and Sudan (with Nigeria and Angola accounting for more than half of the total) (Foster et al., 2008: 19-20 
Conclusions
This paper has tried to debunk the notion that Chinese bilateral lending is devoid of conditionality as is often claimed. We argued that the assumption that China shuns conditionality only holds when conditionality is narrowly understood as implying the policy conditions associated with the lending institutions of the World Bank Group. In this light, a good case could also be made for Western lending being much less conditional than is generally assumed (Bräutigam, 2011: 3) . Reality often comes in shades of grey. The conditionality of China"s lending activities may simply take different forms from the ones that traditionally have been the subject of academic and policy discussion.
Importantly, the conditionalities that we have identified are not imposed by the Chinese state as explicit policy conditions that require changes to national economic policies. While there are some broad demands regarding diplomatic relations and political bottom lines, much of the conditionality seems to emerge as possibly unintended consequences of the plethora of activities that various Chinese state-linked lenders and enterprises engage in. There is an affinity in this idea to Ann-Marie Slaughter"s point of a disaggregated state − the network logic of globalisation having transformed interactions from intergovernmental negotiations between sovereigns to direct interactions between sectoral specialists (Slaughter, 2004: 12 1998, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 
